The entire framework of requirements, building blocks, and attacks as introduced is then used for a comprehensive analysis of the state of the art in collaborative intrusion detection, including a detailed survey and comparison of specific CIDS approaches. Based on this design space, attacks that evade CIDSs and attacks on the availability of the CIDSs themselves are discussed. This article first determines relevant requirements for CIDSs it then differentiates distinct building blocks as a basis for introducing a CIDS design space and for discussing it with respect to requirements. Resulting alerts are correlated among multiple monitors in order to create a holistic view of the network monitored. Depending on the specific CIDS architecture, central or distributed analysis components mine the gathered data to identify attacks. They consist of several monitoring components that collect and exchange data. Since conventional IDSs are not scalable to big company networks and beyond, nor to massively parallel attacks, Collaborative IDSs (CIDSs) have emerged. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are a key component of the corresponding defense measures they have been extensively studied and utilized in the past. At the same time, the 24/7 availability and correct functioning of networked computers has become much more threatened: The number of sophisticated and highly tailored attacks on IT systems has significantly increased.
OSQUERY ARCHITECTURE DRIVERS
The dependency of our society on networked computers has become frightening: In the economy, all-digital networks have turned from facilitators to drivers as cyber-physical systems are coming of age, computer networks are now becoming the central nervous systems of our physical world-even of highly critical infrastructures such as the power grid. At the end of the paper, several important and challenging open problems are proposed in this area. In each category, the detection algorithms are divided into several different subsections based on the key techniques used in the algorithms. These detection methods are put into two categories: host-based and network-based (i.e., connection-chain based), according to whether multiple hosts in the connection chain are involved in the design of detection algorithms. Most of the significant approaches developed by far for stepping-stone intrusion detection are included in this paper. This paper provides a research survey in the area of stepping-stone intrusion detection. Due to such a nature of TCP protocol, the final victim host can only see the traffic from the last session of the connection chain, and it is extremely difficult for the victim host to learn any information about the origin of the attack. Since each interactive TCP session between a client and a server is independent of other sessions even though the sessions may be relayed, so accessing a server via multiple relayed TCP sessions can make it much harder to tell the intruder’s geographical location unless all the compromised servers collaborate with each other and work efficiently. A benefit of using stepping-stones to launch attacks is that intruders can be hidden by a long interactive session.
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In a stepping-stone attack, an intruder uses a chain of hosts on the Internet as relay machines and remotely log in these hosts using tools such as telnet, rlogin, or SSH. Our evaluation results indicate that a single Zeek instance can manage more than 870 osquery hosts and can attribute more than 96% of TCP connections to host-side applications and users in real-time.Īttackers on the Internet often launch network intrusions through compromised hosts, called stepping-stones, in order to reduce the chance of being detected. A distributed deployment enables it to scale with an arbitrary number of osquery hosts. The platform can be flexibly extended with own detection scripts using the already correlated, but also additional dynamically retrieved host data. Our platform can collect, process, and correlate host and network data at large scale, e.g., to attribute network connections to processes and users.
For that, we propose the integrated open-source zeek-osquery platform that combines the Zeek IDS with the osquery host monitor. To overcome these limitations, we extend the scope of Network IDSs (NIDSs) with additional data from the hosts. However, encrypted communication limits their visibility and sophisticated attackers additionally try to evade their detection. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can analyze network traffic for signs of attacks and intrusions.
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